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Theoretical models of cooperation typically assume that agents use simple rules based on last 
encounters, such as “tit-for-tat”, to reciprocate help. In contrast, empiricists generally suppose that 
animals integrate multiple experiences over longer timespans. Here we compared these two 
alternative hypotheses by exposing Norway rats to partners that cooperated on three consecutive days 
but failed to cooperate on the fourth day, and to partners that did the exact opposite. In additional 
controls, focal rats experienced cooperating and defecting partners only once. In a bar-pulling setup, 
focal rats based their decision to provide partners with food on last encounters instead of overall 
cooperation levels. To check whether this might be due to a lack of memory capacity, we tested 
whether rats remember the outcome of encounters that had happened three days before. 
Cooperation was not diminished by the intermediate time interval. We conclude that rats reciprocate 
help mainly based on most recent encounters instead of integrating social experience over longer 
timespans. 
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Introduction 
Evolutionary mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviour between unrelated individuals are hotly 
debated (1,2). If helping others involves fitness costs, future benefits must compensate for this loss for 
cooperation to evolve (3). The reciprocal exchange of help between social partners can lead to stable 
cooperation by taking turns (4). The sequential iterated Prisoner’s dilemma game is a mathematical 
paradigm used to model the prerequisites for evolutionarily stable decision rules of reciprocal 
cooperation in such social dilemmas (5–7). Here, two players can decide either to cooperate with a 
partner or to defect. The dilemma is caused by the payoff matrix. Defecting individuals receive the 
highest benefit in a single interaction, because they receive help without paying any costs of helping 
others. At the same time, if both partners cooperate, they gain more than, if both are defecting. 
Helping a partner while the latter is defecting will deliver the lowest reward, i.e. the “suckers payoff” 
(5). Consequently, if players meet only once, defection is the optimal choice. If partners meet 
repeatedly, however, mutual repeated cooperation between the partners may evolve, leading to the 
highest payoffs. 
Hundreds of behavioural strategies have been modelled to clarify when cooperation can evolve under 
these adverse conditions (5,8). Computer simulations revealed that one of the simplest successful 
strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma game is tit-for-tat (5). Here, players start cooperatively 
and subsequently copy the last behaviour of their social partner. In order to decide whom to help, 
donors need to remember the identity of the partner in combination with the outcome of their last 
interaction. A problem for the tit-for-tat strategy is that mistakes can easily abolish reciprocal 
cooperation. One accidental defection can lead to continued mutual defection, as tit-for-tat is not 
meant to correct mistakes (9). However, memory mistakes may occur. A study of human subjects, for 
instance, showed between 10 and 24% memory errors when subjects were asked to remember only 
the last encounter in an iterated Prisoner’s dilemma game played in groups of 5 to 15 individuals (10). 
This caused cooperation to collapse and the only stable strategy remaining was “always defecting”. A 
possible solution to this problem is a modification of the response strategy, where individuals 
sometimes cooperate even if the last move of their partner was “defecting”; This modified strategy 
has been referred to as “generous tit-for-tat” (11). Another successful variant of the response strategy 
is “win-stay, lose-shift”, where individuals repeat their previous move if doing well, but change 
otherwise (12). 
Generally, strategies taking into account only the last experience can be outcompeted by strategies 
integrating several experiences, e.g. “tit-for-2tats” (13). In nature, animals typically interact more than 
once with each other. By experiencing a partner repeatedly, animals can learn their behavioural 
strategies more easily (14) and response errors are less likely to occur. However, presently it is unclear 
how animals memorize and use previous social experiences in social situations, and whether multiple, 
instead of single, experiences with the same partner are integrated to trigger an appropriate response 
(15). 
Here we ask whether wild-type female Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) base their decision to 
reciprocate help on long-term cooperative experiences with a social partner, or whether they respond 
to the last encounter. We used rats because they form social groups of various sizes (16) and show kin 
(17,18) and individual recognition (19,20). Importantly for our study, rats show a high propensity to 
cooperate (reviewed in: (21,22)). For example, rats prefer to work with a partner, even if they could 
achieve the same reward individually (23). Further, if they can choose between a prosocial option that 
rewards their partner and themselves or a selfish option, they opt for the prosocial option (24). Rats 
have been shown to help conspecifics in different situations. For instance, they were found to free 
trapped partners (25) and to allogroom conspecifics (26), whereby they apply decision rules reflecting 
direct reciprocity (27). They were frequently shown to help conspecifics by donating food to a social 
partner (22), and they exchange different tasks and commodities with each other (28). Previous 
experiments demonstrated that wild-type female Norway rats exchange food according to both direct 
and generalised reciprocity rules (29,30), whereas male Norway rats apparently only apply direct 
reciprocity (31). 
To test the importance of integrated versus last social experiences for the helping propensity of rats, 
focal rats experienced help by partners that cooperated in three successive encounters on three 
consecutive days, but a lack of cooperation in the last encounter before focal rats could provide food 
to their partner. The same focal rats experienced a second partner that defected in all but the last trial 
before the focal rats could repay favours. In addition, focal rats experienced short-term cooperating 
and defecting partners that were experienced only once before they could provide them with food. In 
order to test for a potential limitation of memory capacity, we additionally investigated the focal rats’ 
ability to remember the cooperating and defecting behaviour of partners experienced one or three 
days prior to the test. 
Cooperation in our experiments involved providing food to a partner with the help of the bar-pulling 
paradigm (Fig. 1), reflecting a variant of the iterated sequential Prisoner’s dilemma game (29,32–34). 
We predicted that if rats integrate multiple successive experiences, they will provide more food to 
partners that were cooperating compared to defecting on several consecutive events, even if their last 
experience with the respective partners was opposite. However, if rats base their decision mostly on 
their last encounter, they should provide more food to previously defecting partners that were 
cooperating in the last encounter than to previously cooperating partners that were defecting in their 
last move. Furthermore, in that case their helping propensity should not differ between partners 
experienced only once, or several times. 
 
Materials and methods 
Experimental subjects and housing conditions 
We used female adult outbred wild-type Norway rats, weighing on average 350 g. The rats were 
obtained from the Animal Physiology Department at the University of Groningen (Netherlands) and 
were habituated to handling right after weaning. Rats were individually marked by ear punches. The 
cages (80 x 50 x 37, 5 cm, housing littermates in groups of up to five sisters) were separated from each 
other through opaque walls to exclude interactions between the groups. The housing rooms had a 
temperature of 20°C ± 1°C and a relative humidity of 50 - 60%. The rats were kept under an inversed 
12:12 h light/dark cycle with lights on at 20:00 hours and 30 minutes of dawn and dusk. Rats are 
nocturnal and cannot see the colour red (35,36). Therefore, all trainings and experiments were 
conducted during the dark phase of the daily cycle and under red light. 
Pre-experimental training for food sharing 
Rats were individually trained to use the bar-pulling paradigm (see (37) for a detailed description of 
the procedure). The setup consisted of a test cage (80x 50x 37.5 cm), which was divided by a wire mesh 
into two compartments and a movable tray connected to a stick (Fig. 1). By pulling the stick, the 
platform moved towards the cage and provided food (an oat flake) only to the partner of the pulling 
individual (29). To ensure task understanding, every rat was first trained to pull the tray for itself (solo-
pulling training). After the learning criterion of at least eight pulls within seven minutes was reached, 
we switched to the next stage. From now on, rats were always trained with a sister as training partner, 
and pulling individuals never received a reward for pulling the tray any more (social-pulling training). 
The roles between training partners (donor, recipient) were exchanged and the intervals between 
these switches were increased gradually over 18 sessions, from switching after each pull to switching 
after series of pulls lasting up to seven minutes (i.e., the later experimental period). 
Reciprocity test 
Each focal rat (n= 21) received four experimental treatments (Fig. 2), each consisting of an experience 
and a test phase. During the long-term experience phase, focal rats were exposed to the same social 
partner four times on consecutive days. During the short-term experience phase, focal rats were 
exposed to a social partner only once. In one treatment, the social partner provided food to the focal 
rat by pulling the platform towards the latter on three consecutive days. On the last day of the 
experience phase (t4) the platform was blocked with a string and therefore the partner did not provide 
food to the focal rat (hence called treatment CCCD, where C = cooperation and D = defection). On the 
following day, the roles were reversed so that the focal rat could now pull the platform with food into 
reach of its partner. In a second treatment, the platform was blocked on the first three days so that 
the partner rat did not provide any food to the focal rat. On the 4th day of the experience phase, the 
platform was unblocked and the social partner now provided food to the focal rat (DDDC). Again, on 
day five the focal rat was enabled to provide food to its partner in return. In a third treatment, focal 
rats experienced a social partner once as being a cooperator (C) before they could donate food to it 
during the test phase on the next day. In treatment 4, rats experienced a social partner once as being 
a defector (D) before they could donate food to it during the test phase on the next day. All experience 
and test phases lasted for seven minutes, with one minute of acclimatisation prior to start (30). Rats 
only experienced one trial per day. 
The focal rats’ partners (n= 33) were used several times during the experiment, but we ensured that 
focal rats only met partners that they had not met before the experiment. Each focal rat experienced 
four different unrelated and unfamiliar partners serving as either long-term cooperator, long-term 
defector, short-term cooperator, or short-term defector. We ensured that experimental partners of 
focal rats continued to cooperate with them over several days during the experience phase by making 
use of the fact that rats show generalised reciprocity, i.e. they help others if they received help by 
someone (29). For this purpose we paired partners of focal rats with trained cooperators in the evening 
after they had provided food to the test animals, and these trained cooperators provided food to them 
quasi as a return benefit for their previous cooperation. This procedure ensured that the motivation 
of partners of test animals persisted over the days where they donated food to them without receiving 
any favours from them in return. Focal rats and their partners, the test order of focal rats, and the 
order of treatments were selected randomly using the Excel command RAND(). 
Test of memory capacity 
In order to test the memory capacity of rats, we exposed 25 randomly selected individuals to four 
treatments in a randomized order. Each rat experienced either a cooperating or defecting partner 
during 7 minutes as described in the reciprocity experiment, but this experience happened only once. 
Either one or three days later, the test rats were enabled to provide food for their partner. To make 
the conditions of this memory test as similar to the reciprocity experiment as possible, we provided 
the test rats with similar handling conditions by placing them in an empty cage containing the pulling 
apparatus for the same period (1+7 min) on the two days on which they did not experience help by a 
partner (see Fig. S1). 
The cooperating and defecting partners used in the memory capacity experiment were trained to 
perform their divergent roles. Cooperators (n= 6) were randomly selected amongst individuals with 
good pulling performance after training. They received additional social pulling sessions in which they 
were always paired with another cooperator and thus always cooperated during the experience 
phases. Defectors (n= 6) were randomly selected and did not receive any solo pulling training. They 
experienced the same number of social pulling sessions as the focal rats did, but they were paired with 
other defectors so that they did not learn how to pull. 
Statistical analyses 
All statistical analyses were performed using R (version 2.15.2; with R studio, packages: MASS, lme4, 
TOSTER). In all phases of these experiments, the numbers of pulls (i.e., the numbers of provisions for 
the respective partner) were counted. 
To compare the focal rats’ tendency to help previously experienced partners during the test situation, 
we performed a generalized linear mixed model, assuming a Poisson distribution (GLMM; R command: 
glmer). We tested the model for overdispersion, which was not detected, hence showing an 
appropriate fit. As explanatory variables, we included the last cooperation level by the partner 
(‘cooperating’ or ‘defecting’) and the amount of experiences (‘several’ or ‘one’). As we tested each 
focal rat four times, we included the identity as random variable. Further, we included the partner’s 
identity in the model as a random effect because they served several times as a partner of different 
focal rats. We excluded the non-significant interaction between both explanatory variables (GLMM: β 
= 0.09 ± 0.22, n= 21, p= 0.67) and report the reduced model. Further, we tested which conditions were 
different and were equal to each other by conducting posthoc TOST Paired Samples T-Tests (R 
command: dataTOSTpaired). Additional information on this test can be found in the supplementary 
material. Furthermore, using Spearman rank correlation analyses, we tested the relationship between 
the number of pulls of cooperating partners during their last encounter with the focal subject and the 
number of pulls of the latter during the test phase. 
To compare the focal rats’ ability to remember cooperators and defectors for 1 or 3 days, we analysed 
the total number of pulls for the respective partners using a generalized linear mixed model. We 
included the pulls of focal rats as response variable, the focal and partner rats’ identity as random 
variable to account for multiple testing of the same individuals, and cooperation level of the partners 
(‘cooperating’ or ‘defecting’) as well as the time delay between experience and test phase (‘one’ or 
‘three’ days) as fixed factors. We excluded the non-significant interaction between both explanatory 
variables (GLMM: β= -0.16 ± 0.19, X2= 0.68, p= 0.41) and report the reduced model. We also tested for 
overdispersion of the data, which was not the case. 
 
Results 
Reciprocity test 
Focal rats donated food less often to partners that were defecting on the day before the test 
(treatment CCCD and D vs DDDC and C; GLMM: β = -0.35 ± 0.11, n= 21, p= 0.001; Fig. 3). Their pulling 
rates were lower for partners that they had experienced for four days with conflicting cooperation 
experiences (CCCD or DDDC) than for partners that they only met cooperating or defecting once 
(treatments C and D; GLMM: β = -0.40 ± 0.11, n= 21, p= 0.0003). It should be noted that two rats 
showed high donation rates only in the single experience treatments (C and D; fig. S2). If these two 
rats were removed from the sample, the first effect was still significant (CCCD and D vs. DDDC and C; 
GLMM: β = -0.36 ± 0.12, n= 19, p= 0.003), whereas the latter effect disappeared (CCCD and DDDC vs. 
D and C; GLMM: β = -0.15 ± 0.12, n= 19, p= 0.22). Nevertheless we report the result from the full sample 
as there is no reason to believe that these two rats differed from the others due to reasons suggesting 
their removal from analysis. 
Posthoc analyses revealed that focal rats cooperated more often with C than D partners (Paired 
Samples T-Test: t20= 2.59, p= 0.018). The same was true for DDDC vs. CCCD partners (Paired Samples 
T-Test: t20= 2.29, p= 0.033). Although we did not detect a significant difference between the focal rats’ 
pulling frequency for D and CCCD partners (Paired Samples T-Test: t20= 1.56, p= 0.14), it cannot be 
concluded that focal rats provided equal levels of help to them; the equivalence test did not detect 
equivalence either (TOST Paired Samples T-Test: t20= -0.74, p= 0.24). There was a non-significant trend 
that C partners received more help than DDDC partners (Paired Samples T-Test: t20= 1.85, p= 0.08; 
detailed test results are provided in tab. S1). The number of food donations by focal rats during the 
test phase did not correlate with the number of pulls of partners cooperating during the last experience 
encounters (Spearman rank correlation: S= 1426.3, rho= 0.07, n= 21, p= 0.75). 
Test of memory capacity 
Again, the rats pulled more often for cooperating than for defecting partners (GLMM for number of 
pulls: β= -0.42 ± 0.11, n= 25, p= 0.006; Fig. 4). Notably, this applied irrespectively of whether they had 
experienced their respective partners one or three days prior to the test phase (GLMM: β= -0.01 ± 
0.09, X2= 0.01, n= 25, p= 0.94; Fig. 4). 
 
Discussion 
Rats provided food more often to partners that had been cooperating during the last encounter prior 
to the test than to partners that had been defecting during the last encounter. This suggests that rats 
mainly cooperate according to their last experience with a partner instead of responding to the latter’s 
overall cooperation level. While the last encounter dramatically changed their response towards 
conspecifics, cumulative experience may still have some effect, as in direct comparisons DDDC and C 
partners, as well as CCCD and D partners, were not treated equally. The trend that rats cooperated 
more often with C than DDDC partners might suggest some integration, as DDDC partners were 
previously not always cooperative, whereas C partners were, because they were experienced only 
once and only as cooperators. Hence, rats might consider information of previous encounters as well. 
Overall, however, rats clearly weigh the last experience disproportionally. 
The fact that rats base their decision to reciprocate help mainly on their last interaction with a partner, 
which happened one day before the test, might suggest that they are unable to remember interactions 
that had occurred in a more distant past. However, our second experiment of the rats’ ability to 
remember the behaviour of partners for one or for three days did not indicate a decline of memory 
during this time span. The rats provided more food when facing a previous cooperator than a previous 
defector independently of the time span that had passed between experience and test phase. The rats 
were thus able to remember the outcome of their social interactions with a partner at least for three 
days. These results suggest that rats have access to social information spanning several days. 
Nevertheless, they consider mainly the most recent experience when deciding to help a partner. 
Importantly, the results cannot be explained by memory extinction, memory interference or 
conditioning. (i) Memory extinction denotes the loss of a conditioned response that is not rewarded 
anymore. Theoretically, rats might simply associate the movement of the platform with a reward. If a 
defector did not pull the stick, focal rats may have reduced pulling the platform in the test phase merely 
because of the lack of a rewarding movement in the previous experience phase. However, rats can 
remember the behaviour of two (30,31) and four partners (38) that were experienced in a sequence 
and help previous cooperators more often than previous defectors, independently of the last 
experience before being tested. Thus, despite the last experience differing from their test partners’ 
cooperation levels, rats are able to distinguish between previous cooperators and defectors. 
Therefore, the rats’ cooperation decisions are apparently not constrained by memory extinction. (ii) 
Memory interference describes that new information interferes with earlier information, causing the 
latter’s devaluation. According to this logic newly available information may replace previous 
information, which might explain why rats cooperated according to the last experience. This possibility 
can also be excluded, however. A study, based on a similar experimental design as reported here, that 
presented rats with a sequence of different cooperating or defecting partners, showed that focal rats 
responded to each individual partner according to its previous behaviour, despite the fact that the last 
interaction with a different partner provided the opposite cooperation experience (38). Hence, the last 
experience did not interfere with the memory of previous interactions with other partners. (iii) 
Conditioning cannot explain our results either, because in the same experimental setup rats have been 
repeatedly shown to refrain from pulling food towards the neighbouring cage compartment after 
experiencing cooperating partners if that compartment is empty, whereas they do pull food towards 
it when the previous cooperator is present in that compartment (29,30,39,40). Furthermore, previous 
experiments revealed that rats do not merely copy their partner’s behaviour in the experimental 
paradigm we used, because they successfully transfer between different actions of help, e.g. pushing 
a lever or pulling a tray to deliver food to a partner (41), and they exchange different commodities with 
a partner such as allogrooming for food (28). In addition they also exchange services that do not involve 
any instrumental training, such as reciprocal allogrooming (27). In summary, rats seem to base their 
decisions to help primarily on the last encounters with their partner, which seems not to be affected 
by any memory constraints and cannot be explained by conditioning (cf.(42)). 
Under natural conditions, rats live in groups of various sizes ranging up to 200 individuals (43). In such 
large colonies, it may be difficult to keep track of previous encounters with different social partners, 
even if these are biased towards members of a limited subgroup. Living in large groups is assumed to 
make strategies that monitor several encounters with different interaction partners cognitively 
demanding (44). Although the occurrence of mistakes could be lowered if several encounters were 
considered, applying simpler decision rules might be better when exposed to complex social challenges 
(45–48). For instance, humans cooperating in an iterated Prisoner’s dilemma game were shown to 
switch to using only the information of the last encounter when challenged with a working memory 
task between interactions (49). In addition, while cooperation in iterated Prisoner’s dilemma games is 
modelled as an all-or-nothing response, cooperation in the real world is more likely a continuous 
response, i.e. cooperating more or less. Under this condition, providing some help to defectors, even 
if considerably less than for cooperators, could act as a buffer for memory mistakes or provide 
incentives to social partners to start cooperating (11). Rats helped defectors less than cooperators, but 
they provisioned defectors to some extent too. Hence their strategy seems to be more forgiving than 
the narrow tit-for-tat strategy characterized by an all-or-nothing response. 
Our results are consistent with the observation that female Norway rats apparently lack social bonds 
(50). Instead of incorporating information over several encounters into a stable social bond, rats seem 
to continuously replace information by each interaction. This may be a cognitively less demanding way 
to cope with a multitude of interactions involving many different social partners, which seems to be 
the natural situation in Norway rats (see above). Nevertheless, this recency effect might also be 
important for animals exhibiting social bonds that are influenced by cooperation. The more animals 
weigh the last experience, the more likely social bonds change over time. In fact, many decisions of 
animals both in sociopositive and socionegative contexts might be driven only or primarily by last 
experiences (51), which may be memorised over extended periods. Hence, we urge that more 
manipulative studies are needed to carefully disentangle the relative importance of last from 
integrative information on social partners in a range of different animals and contexts. 
Previous experiments testing for contingent responses in repeated donation games using fish (e.g. (52–
54)), birds (e.g. (55–57)), and primates (e.g. (58–60)) did not allow distinguishing between immediate 
and cumulative responses to cooperation or defection of their partners. Therefore, to the best of our 
knowledge this study is the first to test for these alternative possibilities. Given the scepticism that 
animals use decision rules based on last encounters, similar to tit-for-tat, in mutual cooperation 
(10,15), our results prompt a re-evaluation of the behavioural mechanisms involved in reciprocal 
cooperation. 
Various proximate mechanisms have been suggested to underlie reciprocal cooperation. These include 
decisions based on symmetrical traits (“symmetry-based reciprocity”), recollection of the quantity or 
quality of received help and consequential attribution of appropriate returns (“calculated reciprocity”), 
remembrance of prior short-term attitudes or long-term emotions associated with a particular partner 
(“attitudinal reciprocity” and “emotional bookkeeping”), or a response to physiological changes caused 
by received help (61,62). Calculated reciprocity is probably the most contended among these 
mechanisms, because it implies scorekeeping of received help. We did not find an association between 
the numbers of donations received and given, which is at variance with the assumptions of this 
mechanism. This finding is in line with other studies ((59,63) but see (64)). Decision making in 
cooperative contexts can be explained by short-term physiological changes (reviewed in: (65)). In our 
study, this is rather unlikely to have strongly affected the results, because rats were tested 24 hours 
after the last encounter (during the memory capacity test even three days after meeting the partner). 
A memory of emotions or attitudes associated with a certain partner might have been involved in the 
regulation of reciprocal cooperation in our experiment, as emotions are known to bias decisions (66) 
and reduce memory errors (67), which is an important precondition for successful application of a tit-
for-tat like strategy. 
In conclusion, our results show that rats cooperate more often with social partners that have been 
cooperative in their latest interaction. Apparently, Norway rats use a simple heuristic based primarily 
on the outcome of their last interaction, resembling a tit-for-tat like strategy that cannot be attributed 
to a lack of memory capacity as suggested by the results of our memory capacity test. As this is the 
first study disentangling recent from cumulative information on the cooperation propensity of social 
partners, more research is needed to test such decision rules in different social contexts and in a variety 
of species.  
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Fig. 1: Apparatus to provide food to each other 
Rats could provide food to each other by pulling a stick connected to a movable platform. By pulling 
the stick, the platform moves into the experimental cage and provides food only to the recipients. 
During the experience phase, focal rats experienced partners as cooperating food providers or 
defecting non-providers. During the test phase, the roles were exchanged and focal rats could pull 
the stick to deliver food to their social partner. 
 
 Fig. 2: Experimental set-up 
During the experience phase, focal rats received help from a partner that pulled a platform towards 
them, which provided a food reward. In the CCCD treatment, the partner provided food on 3 
consecutive days (“cooperation experience”, C), but failed on day 4 (“defection experience”, D; 
platform blocked, indicated by a cross across the pulling stick). During the DDDC treatment, the 
platform was blocked during the first 3 days so that the focal rats did not receive help from the 
partner. On day 4, the platform was unblocked and the partner delivered food to the focal individual. 
In the D treatment, the partner was only experienced once as a defector not providing any food. 
Finally, in the C treatment, the partner was only experienced once as a cooperator providing food 
to the focal subject. During the test phase (day 5), the focal rat got access to the platform and could 
provide food to the partner it had experienced on the previous 4 days. Each focal rat was tested in 
all four treatments. 
  
 Fig. 3: Food donations of focal rats to their social partners depending on the latter’s previous long-
term or short-term cooperation propensity. 
Focal rats pulled more often for partners (DDDC) that had defected for three days but cooperated 
on the last day prior the test phase, compared to partners (CCCD) that had cooperated for three 
days but defected on the last day (indicated by continuous orange line). Likewise, rats provided more 
food to cooperating (C) than to defecting partners (D) that had been encountered only once, i.e. on 
the day before they could provide them with food (indicated by dashed blue line). Median 
frequencies with interquartile ranges are shown. The individual donation rates are shown in Fig. S2. 
  
 Fig. 4: Total number of pulls of focal rats for cooperators and defectors experienced once, either 
one or three days prior to the test 
Rats provided more food to cooperative than to defective partners, irrespective of whether the 
partners’ helpfulness was experienced one or three days prior to the test. Median frequencies of 
pulls with interquartile ranges are shown. 
  
Appendix: Comparisons between the four experimental conditions 
We performed TOST Paired Samples T-Test to examine potential differences and equivalences 
between conditions (tab. S1) by reversing the roles of H0 and H1, taking into account that the data are 
paired, i.e. the same focal rats were tested repeatedly (1). This test is based on a parametric t-test, 
whereas our data were not normally distributed. However, based on our sample size this assumption 
violation does not impact the detection rate of this test (2). Further, we validated this approach by 
comparing our results to a permutated Paired Samples T-Test (R package: RVAideMemoire, code: 
perm.t.test with 5000 permutations). The results did not deviate from the results obtained with TOST 
Paired Samples T-Tests, which seems therefore a valid test for our data (3). 
This TOST Paired Samples T-Test requires defining a threshold above which two conditions are 
considered as equal. A medium sized effect size is d= 0.5, i.e. two groups differ by half the standard 
deviation, which is commonly used for equivalence tests (4). Hence, we set the upper and lower 
equivalence boundaries symmetrically to ± 0.5. If the true effect (± 90% confidence interval) was within 
this boundary, it was considered to be equal. To test whether the effect is within the boundaries, two 
one-sided tests are conducted. If both one-sided tests are significant, H0 can be rejected, i.e. the 
conditions can be considered to be equal. 
1.  Lakens D. Equivalence tests: a practical primer for t-tests, correlations, and meta-analyses. Soc 
Psychol Personal Sci. 2017;8(4):355–62. 
2.  Mara CA, Cribbie RA. Paired-samples tests of equivalence. Commun Stat Simul Comput. 
2012;41(10):1928–43. 
3. Konietschke F, Pauly M. Bootstrapping and permuting paired t-test type statistics. Stat 
 Comput (2014) 24:283–96. 
4.  Lakens D, Scheel AM, Isager PM. Equivalence testing for psychological research: a tutorial. 
 Adv Methods Pract Psychol Sci. 2018;1(2):259–69. 
Tab. S1 Comparisons between the four experimental conditions  
Condition Dissimilarity 
Similarity 
TOST upper boundary TOST lower boundary 
C vs. D t20= 2.59, p= 0.02 t20= -0.30, p= 0.61 t20= 4.88, p< 0.001 
DDDC vs. CCCD t20= 2.29, p= 0.03 t20= -0.01, p= 0.50 t20= 4.58, p< 0.001 
D vs CCCD t20= 1.56, p= 0.14 t20= -0.74, p= 0.24 t20= 3.85, p< 0.001 
C vs. DDDC t20= 1.85, p= 0.08 t20= -0.44, p= 0.33 t20= 4.14, p< 0.001 
Focal rats experienced four partners that were experienced once as cooperators (C) and defectors (D), 
as well as four times as overall cooperators that were defecting in the last round (CCCD) and overall 
defectors that cooperated in the last round (DDDC). Comparisons were made using the TOST Paired 
Samples T-Test, testing for differences and similarities between conditions. 
 Fig. S1: Experimental setup of the memory capacity test 
Focal rats experienced either cooperating (provided food) or defecting (did not provide food, indicated by a 
cross across the pulling stick) social partners one or three days prior to the test phase. In the test phase (day 
4), focal rats were enabled to provide food to their partners. 
  
 Fig. S2: Food donations of focal rats to their social partners depending on the latter’s previous long-term or 
short-term cooperation propensity. 
Focal rats pulled more often for partners (DDDC) that had defected for three days but cooperated on the last 
day prior the test phase, compared to partners (CCCD) that had cooperated for three days but defected on 
the last day (panel a, long-term conflicting experience). Likewise, rats provided more food to cooperating (C) 
than to defecting partners (D) that had been encountered only once, i.e. on the day before they could provide 
them with food (panel b, short-term consistent experience). Every line represents the raw data for a single 
focal rat towards its partner. To avoid overlap of data, we raised the respective lines of 4 individuals in (a) and 
in (b) by 0.5 units on the ordinate for better visibility. The slopes of lines were not affected by this measure. 
 
